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Jesus said-
And  the  New  Year  arrived.  The New Millenium.  Just another day in a 
lifetime of similar days.  But each one of them crowded with possibility. 
The possibility of disaster, the possibility of perfection ...  What would 
become of them? I wondered. In another hundred years would they all be 
born in test tubes or perhaps evolve through computers to become groups 
of disembodied digitised intelligence machines  . . . In a hundred years 
would they be living on other planets? Would the Earth still exist? Would 
they  engineer  themselves  genetically so  that disease was  a thing  of the 
past? Would they  all  become just one  big multi-ethnic race?  Will  they 
discover  the  secret of the  universe? ... Will  they  all  speak the  same 
language in the future?  Will they make love? Maybe there will be more 
than two sexes. Will they still believe life is sacred? Will it matter? Do we 
matter? (Hal Hartley, The Book of  Life, Fr. 2000). 
The Golden Clock 
Bendigo is a small rural town, situated in an old goldrnining area of Australia's 
southeast hinterland. There isn't much in Bendigo-an assortment of shops and 
service facilities, a recreation reserve, a public hall and clock tower. The tower, 
like  many  other nineteenth century public buildings in this part of Australia, 
was  built from gold money.  Not just the taxes provided by lucky strikes, but 
from a largesse that was formed from the energies of an immigrant population 
which quickly overcame its disappointment to engage in the creation of a new 
capitalist economy within a new democratic social order.  The clock tower in 
B~ndigo, therefore, marks a time in colonial history when men were mad; they 
tned  their  luck  then  turned  their  disappointment  to  the  greater  glory  of 
democratic liberation and the authority of their own freedom. 
In  capturing  and  flattening  time,  the  public  exhibition of the  horologe 
succinctly and subtley re-situates that madness. Time is  the most precious and 
elusive of all human resources; its attachment to gold along with the authority 108  J. LEWIS AND K. BEST 
of the  state  and democratic freedom forcefully  articulates  the imperatives of 
modernism and  modernization.  To this  extent,  the  golden  clock of Bendigo 
might  seem  to  represent  the  contiguity  of contending  ideas  on  time.  In 
particular, the mathematical metering of a written time, a unity that returns time 
to  its  spatial  correlative,  the  ticking  onward  of time  over  value,  time  as 
progress, time as growth, time as the end/means of prosperity. This time/value 
is  the  instinctive inscription of humanist teleology- from Hegel to  Kant to 
Kierkegaard  time  is  the  constant,  the  unravelling  of a destiny  in  which  the 
variable of human values must divide itself. 
Of course,  the  horologe  captures  time  for  the  division  of labour,  the 
exchange  of goods,  and  the  rational  order of industrial  modernism.  Writing 
time becomes the central motif for the inscription of value. To negate the clock 
is  to  surrender to  the  nihilism of a value-less  social condition,  the open and 
ambiguous  will-to-value  of  Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche.  But  this  too  is 
emblemized in the Bendigo clock-face: the will of the gold men, the anarchy of 
wealth,  the  anti-authority of the  gold rush seditions.  The clock mediates  the 
contentiousness of modernism by reducing it to a steady and cyclical order, an 
inevitability  which  expresses  itself  in  the  paradoxical  convergence  of the 
collective will, democracy and individual prosperity. The clock is all-time and 
particulated time; Bergson's infinitude captured in the space of a ceaseless and 
repetitive cycle of motion. 
ATAVIZING AND DIGITIZING TIME 
Commentators  like  Jean  Baudrillard  (esp  1994)  have  identified  a  radical 
irruption  of time/value  during  the  twentieth century.  Even so,  the  symbolic 
concentration of  modernization processes has its parallels in more recent events 
around  Bendigo.  The  clock  remains  the  central  marker  of  time,  though 
computer networked communication has replaced minerals and manufacturing 
as  the  primary  denominator  of social  and  economic  value.  The  move  from 
modernization through to what many call postmodernization clearly implicates 
communicative  technologies,  most  particularly  those  engaged  in  digital 
information  transfer.  Digitization  challenges  the  convergent  and  stabilizing 
effects of writing time; instantanaeity prises open Bergson's paradox, exposing 
it to  the  conditions  of a  'quantum time'  where  progress  and  history  can be 
inverted  and  where  the  meaning  of time. entirely  surrenders  its  constancy. 
Moving beyond Jameson's  (1991)  historical amnesia,  this instantaneity might 
be  understood  as  a resonance  of values  or meanings  that  can no  longer be 
located from a spatial source.  The meanings,  like waves  in a pool, interact, 
overflow and alter the paths of other waves. 
fu  this  context,  economic  and  social  values  have  become  increasingly 
differentiated.  The  global  trade  of capitalist  commodities,  including  listed 
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instantaneity of communicative interaction. The capitalist system of symbolic 
exchange value is now entirely constituted through computer networking; value 
thus becomes a contingency of the moment to moment ascription of 'price' or 
market-derived worth/value. Of course traders have always traded present value 
against future value: that is, they have traded in the commodity of time. But this 
process of time/value exchange has intensified through digital networking and 
the  irruptions  constitued  through  instantaneity.  Future  value  has  been 
compressed in present value, creating a precarious and highly volatile market 
which  perpetually seeks  to  stabilize itself through  the  exertion of the  coded 
values  of the  system itself.  That is,  the  convergent authority of the  clock as 
moment  in  progress  is  being  critically  challenged  by  a  new  compression 
whereby the authority of the system is asserted in the instantaneous more than 
in the 'end' of a progression. 
As  a predicate of negative  as  well  as  positive portents, this  system will 
necessarily  be threatened by its  own  resonant brilliance.  The clock tower in 
Bendigo,  therefore,  assumes  an  additional  symbolic  function  for  those 
Millennia!  observers  who  feared  a  cataclysmic  collapse  of  the 
telecommunications system when the clock ticked over to 2000AD. The future 
became  tradeable  not merely for  those  who  paid  out millions  of dollars  to 
protect their company  value against the  anticipated catastrophe,  but also  for 
those  who  exchanged their First World lifestyles  for  the  safety  of a global 
outpost.  This  latter  group  of Millennia!  cultural  refugees  found  alternative 
meanings in the Y2K; they looked beyond the salvation of pre-existing systems 
and  sought  safety  in  the  spatial  and  social  margins.  The meaning  of Y2K, 
therefore,  was  formed  around  new  possibilities,  a  social  and  personal 
pilgrimage that would be as  radical and revolutionary as  the formation of the 
modem  democratic  state.  The  Millennia!  refugees  'prospected'  the  globe  in 
order to locate a territory conducive to the creation of a new social order. With 
its fresh  air and water, sparsity of population and mild climate, Bendigo was 
identified  as  an  ideal  site  for  the  establishment  of  a  post-Armageddon 
community, a virtualized community that could sustain itself against the horrors 
of a Y2K darkness. 
These Millennials, however, were not Luddites rejecting the hegemony of 
technological  capitalist culture,  nor were  they  seeking  the  sort  of Romantic 
naturalism that had  inspired  the  hippie  movement of the  1960s.  Indeed,  the 
leaders  of  the  group  were  themselves  'cyborg  workers'  (Bogard,  1996), 
professional software developers, programmers and computer engineers. Their 
convictions were constructed, it seems, out of an intimate knowledge of digital 
network processing, its limits and possibilities. The Millennials were convinced 
that  they  would  inherit  the  matrix,  forming  an  alternative  space  for  the 
reconstruction  of the  global  community  and  its  ideologies.  The  Y2K  bug 
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symbolic value of the future,  were written as a death into the programming of 
the  original  digital  systems.  In conceiving  of the  bug  in  these  terms,  the 
Bendigo  Millennials  hoped  to  restore  time,  lever  it from  the  resonance  of 
instantaneity, and re-capture the (atavistic) vision of humanist progressivism. 
Like many other digital utopians (see Lewis,  1998).  the Bendigo Millennials 
wanted to re-capture time by refurbishing the meaning of computer networked 
communication. The digital clock, therefore, would simulate the golden clock 
of the democratic age of writing time. 
This image of the past as  fundamentally deficient is a critical property of 
modernization's  progressivist  ideology.  In  order  to  heroize  the  future, 
recalcitrant  time  is  to  be  disciplined by the  ascendant progressivism of the 
present.  To  this  extent  the  Bendigo  Millennials  were  attempting  to  restore 
history  through  a  cultural  politics  which  necessarily  implicated  computer 
networked  systems.  The  Millennials  prepared  themselves  with  enough 
provisions to survive the dark hour and beyond. We can imagine them as  the 
midnights  strike westward across  the  globe.  The  horologes  click over to  the 
new millennium.  Billions of dollars  worth of consulting and re-programming 
fees,  the  midnight  cheers,  the  fireworks,  Auld  Lang  Syne,  embraces  and 
drunken  sprawls.  And all  the  while  the  Millennials  sit nervously  waiting in 
their  farmhouse  in  Bendigo.  Of  course  nothing  much  happened.  The 
Millennials  must  have  looked  disconsolately  at  their  cans  of beans  and 
powdered milk. They would have switched on the radio and television as they 
had always  done.  They would  have  heard the  news,  clicked on the  internet, 
trawled  around  to  their  various  Millennia!  websites  and  asked,  'What  went 
wrong? Why 2K?' 
These electronic refugees,  of course,  personify  a pervasive First World 
anxiety  about the  prospects  of a new  millennium,  most particularly  as  it is 
experienced through networked communication systems.  The new democratic 
order they had imagined constituted a peculiar reciprocate of these anxieties, a 
dialogic rejoinder to the fears  and risks  associated with (post)modernization. 
To  this  extent,  the  new  anxiety/idealism  articulated  in  the  Millennia! 
changeover represents a re-engagement of the  ongoing project of democratic 
liberalism  and  capitalist  culture.  It  is  not  that  the  new  electronic  culture 
overtakes  the  earlier,  Enlightenment-based  ideological  anxieties  and  ideals; 
rather  the  force  of these  more  recent  democratic  discourses  resonates  and 
engages through the  earlier democratic mop1entum.  Gold and silicon, writing 
and imaging, Constitution and freedom, citizenship and evasion-this mingling 
of  political  'dictions'  is  articulated  through  a  contemporary  culture  of 
democracy. 
To this  extent,  Bendigo's  clocktower marks  the  historical confluence of 
political ideals. First, the cyclical scale that orders and contains time within its 
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imagined  as  the  final  referent,  a  material  standard  of  value  which  was 
ideologised in terms of a temporal stability and perpetuity. Secondly, the clock 
and  its  relentless momentum present an alternative diction which emphasizes 
the instability of time as the instant where the past is an atavistic imagining and 
the present is inevitably incomplete; to this extent, the temporal relic stands at 
the centre of a constructed social order, an imagined distillation which is swept 
and  particulated  like  electrons  in  a  quantum  dust.  This  new  horologe  is 
digitised,  mediated and remediated through a concentration of instantaneities 
and  meaning  possibilities.  The  clock,  therefore,  is  neither  one  thing  nor 
another:  it  is  a  constituency  or  assemblage  of cultural  dictions,  including 
democratic dictions. Writing democracy integrates and dissolves itself through 
new forms of computer networked expression, new forms of electronic culture. 
Our  aim in  this  paper is  to  explicate democracy in  terms  of these mediatory 
technologic  contexts. That is,  we  seek to present a theoretical framing which 
places the concept of democracy within a contemporary cultural ambit. 
Democratic Cultures 
We  would  want  to  state  at  the  outset that 'culture'  should be defined  as  an 
assemblage  of discourses  which  operate in a relative  and  open collective in 
order  to  produce meaning.  The concept of democracy, therefore, needs to be 
placed  within  a cultural assemblage.  The limitation of recent attempts to re-
theorize democracy derives from a fundamental resistance to this understanding 
of culture,  and more  specifically  a notion of cultures  of democracy.  These 
assemblages  of meaning  are  formed  through  social  practices  of meaning-
making,  including  the  deployment  of media  and  media  technologies  in  a 
globalist  context.  From this  perspective,  some  recent attempts  to re-theorize 
democracy as a more heterogeneous (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, Laclau, 1996), 
global (Held, 1995, Held et al, 1999), personal (Giddens, 1994) or participative 
(Habermas,  1989, McGuigan, 1996) facility for the fulfilment of the civic ideal 
remain  fixedly  ambivalent about the  relationship between the  media,  culture 
and politics. fu particular, these theorists are discomforted by the resistance of 
the  media  and its  cultures  to  political theorization generally and a reformist 
agenda in particular. 
Our  argument  here  is  simply  that  this  resistance  is  constituted largely 
through the increasing complexity of contemporary culture and its mediations. 
'Culture' in this sense is an epitome for those diverse assemblages of meanings 
We have referred to as cultures; for our purposes, neither the collective culture 
nor its  constituent cultures is  privileged since both refer to a broad and often 
disjunctive assemblage of overlapping and interdependent meanings (including 
non-meanings).  Our preference  for  a notion of 'dictions'  and  'heterodictions' 
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articulate  their specific  meanings  into unstable but necessary communicative 
modes; implicit in this notion of diction are the limits, deferrals and gaps that 
function  to  impede  or  deconstruct  meaning-making.  Contemporary  culture, 
therefore,  needs  to  be  conceived  as  a discursive  conglomerate of struggling 
parts. Amongst these struggling parts are the democratic cultures with which 
we are concerned here. Our aim is to relate these democratic cultures to another 
set of overlapping and disjunctive cultures specifically associated with media 
technology. As we shall outline below, these technological democratic cultures 
are  formed  in  time  though  they  are  not restricted  by  time.  That  is,  while 
technology and its culture are constituted historically, they may also adapt and 
change within evolving historical contexts. Technology and its meanings are as 
fluid  and  precarious  as  time  itself and may  be  reconstituted  in many  ways 
through various contexts. 
The  concept  of  language  wars  (Lewis  2000)  indicates  how  these 
multiplying meanings operate within and against one another, even through the 
less visible formations of history. Contests over the definition and ideological 
value  of democracy  are  articulated  through historical  language  wars.  fu our 
view,  the  two  major  historical  phrasings  of  democracy  can  be  identified 
through  the  formation  of print  culture  and  electronic  culture.  Unlike  the 
historical  and  technological  determinists,  such  as  McLuhan  and  Baudrillard 
who tend to regard history in teleological terms, we would see the relationship 
between  these  two  phrasings  as  complicated  through  the  interweaving  of 
continuity, discontinuity, competition and consonance. As noted in the example 
of the  Bendigo  clocktower  and  its  confluence  of historical  meanings,  the 
discourses  which constitute  these  historical phrasings  shift according  to the 
position of their reading.  fu particular, writing culture continues today but its 
meanings  are  negotiated  through  its  juxtaposition  and  interaction  with 
electronic  culture.  Our  own  reading  of writing  and  electronic  democracies, 
therefore,  seeks  to  understand  them in  terms  of this  cultural  and  historical 
contiguity,  rather  than  through  the  isolating  of their  individual  historical 
formation. 
PRINT CULTURE DEMOCRACY 
The  development,  or rather  re-development,  of the  printing press  from  the 
fifteenth century facilitated the broadening of social complexity, including the 
formation  of the  industrialized,  urbanized  nation-state  (Eisenstein,  1983). 
Benedict Anderson (1991) argues  that the ideology of nation and nationalism 
was  made  possible through  the  disseminating power of printed information. 
Governments  were  able  to  administer increasingly  complex and large  social 
organizations,  and  citizens  were  able  to  'imagine'  their  communal  links, 
Anderson argues, because print facilitated the retention and exchange of dense 
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legalism  was  necessary,  we  might  add,  for  the  expansion  of  commerce, 
consumerism  and  global  capital.  In  this  sense,  however,  mass  printing 
facilitated the commodification not merely of information, but of ideology and 
time.  The  indeterminancy of time,  in particular,  could be fixed  through the 
formation of fixed memory. Time which provided a mere backdrop to human 
activities within an occlusive framework of birth and death could now be held 
and measured through the invocation of particular ideology. 'The time it takes' 
could be chronicled not only in the repetitive scale of an horologe, but in the 
enduring frame of text and record. As the denominator of value, time becomes 
implicated  in the  operations  of the  capitalist system of discrimination-and 
hence in the operation of power and ideology. 
To this extent, we  would suggest that democracy was  a political facility 
which was constructed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in order 
to deal with this increased density of cultural and social complexity. In a sense, 
democracy  was  formed  in  association  with  the  textualization  of time.  This 
textualization represented the convergence of an infinitely distendable time in 
an unlocatable 'now' (absence), with an isolated and textualized time measured 
and fixed in horologes and written records (presence). This nexus of absence-
presence, in fact, constitutes an underlying pattern informing the operations of 
Enlightenment-based  modernization,  most  particularly  in  the  progress  of 
capitalism  and  its  ideologies.  In this  sense,  economists  like  Adam  Smith 
attempt to solidify the arbitrary social construct of value by placing it within 
the ambit of textualized (writing) time. The unstable nexus of absence-presence 
is  consequently,  perhaps  necessarily,  obscured  by  the  ideology  of 
production/consumption  'choice'  which,  for  classical  economics,  is  the 
fundamental  motivation  of capitalism.  Were the  absence-presence instability 
exposed,  then  the  arbitarariness  of  capitalist  'value'  and  hierarchical 
discrimination  would  be  rendered  vulnerable  perhaps  to  challenge  and 
repudiation by those less favoured by its operations. The ideology of choice, 
therefore, supports the obscuration of this internal instability by claiming it as a 
fixed presence in writing. 
.  The  freedom to  choose,  therefore,  is  implicated in  the  writing  process 
Inasmuch  as  writing is  at the  centre  of modernization.  Democracy is  forged 
through  this  abstract rendering of value-over-time within a social framework 
Which  seeks  to  reconcile  the  interests  of social  elites,  individuals  and  the 
collective mass. In order to achieve this complicated reconciliation, the concept 
of 'freedom' or 'choice' is formalised in time-that is, in writing. Old solutions 
to  the problem of individual and collective interests-autocracy, bondage and 
corporeal  coercion-became less  sustainable  in  an  increasingly  mobile  and 
abstract capitalist economy constituted around symbolic exchange, freedom and 
choice. Writing and writing culture contributed to the development, expression 
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however,  writing as  representation constitutes an  absence-presence:  the world 
of phenomena is objectified as a fixed reality though this reality is only ever a 
representation of what is not actually present. When transformed into writing, 
choice  (like  time  and  all  other  phenomena)  becomes  a  representation,  an 
absence-presence. 
This  absence-presence  nevertheless  is  critical  to  the  operations  of 
capitalist economy and the imagined reconciliation of the various gradients of 
choice by individuals and the assemblage of choosers. Thus, the economics of 
'choice', like the economics of territory or resources, becomes constituted and 
'protected' through culture, politics and various modes of institutional process 
and practice. The emerging centralization of choice and freedom in culture and 
economics contributes to the formation of new ideological fields of reference. 
Democracy  is  a key  part of this  re-formulation;  its  relationship  to  ideology, 
choice and writing can be identified in three distinct ways-
1.  Democracy is part of the symbolic rendering of choice and the discriminations 
that  are  constituted  as  value-over-time.  Democracy symbolizes  an  imprecise 
freedom  which  is  necessary  for  the  operation  of an  hierarchical  economic 
system. The system discriminates between individuals but this discrimination is 
justified on the grounds of the individual's freedom to choose. The democratic 
ideal, that is, seeks to reconcile the individual with the collective through the 
mediatory operations of choice. 
2.  The  ideology of choice,  therefore,  commits  the  individual  to  the  overriding 
system. Because the individual is no longer coerced physically but participates 
voluntarily, power becomes dissolved through the processes of mediation. That 
is,  the  individual  subject becomes  him/herself symbolically  rendered  in  the 
value  exchange  system:  the  individual  is  another  symbolic  unit  in  the 
interactions  of  value-over-time.  Significantly,  the  symbolism  of  'choice' 
neutralises  alternatives,  creating  the  cultural  conditions  of  an  imagined 
autonomy  within  a  system  which  seems  constantly  to  return  power  and 
responsibility to the individual subject. 
3.  This  symbolic  rendering  is  expressed  directly  through  the  operations  of 
democratic institutions. The valorization of the individual as a political chooser 
analogizes the valorization of the individual as a wealth-maker and chooser of 
capitalist products.  The individual subject chooses  his/her representative; the 
system reciprocates by protecting the individual's 'right' to choose. 
Choice is not, therefore, absolute choice which would necessarily threaten the 
social bond. Rather, choice is concentrated through the ideals and ideology of 
the bond itself, of the individual to other individuals-the absence-presence of 
freedom to  choose become articulated as  the freedom for all, a protection as 
much as an emancipation. 
Freedom and harm minimization in the exercise of choice are 'reconciled' 
through the formalizations of political and democratic discourse. Print culture 
has  this  same  absence-presence  at  its  centre.  The  sovereignty  of individual 
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nexus  is  ideologically complex, constituting in itself a language war between 
the  interests of particular members and whole groups of people. In particular, 
Enlightenment-based democratic theory never resolves these competing claims, 
but rather sustains them though the artifice of a discursive and orderly present. 
In fact,  the  establishment of print-based democracy was  essential, we  would 
suggest,  to  the  distillation  of tensions  which  were  widespread  through  the 
operations  of  cultural  modernization.  This  collective-individual  tension  is 
manifest  through  the  many  parallel  tensions  which  underscore  capitalist 
culture-supply-demand, competition-community, hierarchy-equality, writing-
speech,  order-freedom,  mind-body,  reason-sensibility.  While  theorists  of 
postmodernism have often sought to neutralize these dichotomies by locating 
them purely in the period of modernity, we would suggest that they continue as 
part  of the  broad  spectrum  of heterodictions  that  constitute  contemporary 
culture. These print-based dictions may be seen as assembling around two more 
or  less  distinct  democratic  cultures:  representative  government  and 
participative democracy. 
A.  Representative government is formed through the upward delegation of power 
by the citizens to  an imagined meritocracy. Unlike the classical Greek model, 
representative democracy is formed through the rational surrender of power by 
the  citizemy  to  others  whom  they  elect  to  rule  them.  Through  the 
Enlightenment  theorizations  of  Hobbes  and  the  Mills  to  more  recent 
theorizations by Schumpeter (e.g.  1987) and others, democracy is regarded as 
the  most practical  and  pragmatic  option for  a mass  society.  Social  order is 
assured  as  citizens  will  knowlingly  and  willingly  sacrifice  absolute 
independence and 'freedom' for  the greater security and freedom provided by 
the state. Rousseau idealizes this relationship by contending that the principle 
of majority  rule  necessarily  accords  with  the principles  of self-interest  and 
personal freedom;  the  decision of the majority can never be at  odds  with  a 
deviating position since that position is  necessarily neutralised by the greater 
good of community accord. 
Print, of course, facilitates this ideal-first, by providing the facility of complex 
political processes such as constitution, election and legislation; and secondly, 
through the paradigm of the text whereby the rational arrangement of individual 
thoughts and word into an organic whole become an analogue for the rational 
arrangement of the  state.  All  parts contribute to  the orderly operation of the 
whole; each is a reciprocate of the other. 
In practice, of course,  the processes of representative government constantly 
submerge  the  interests  of individuals  and  minority  groups.  Moreover,  the 
rationality of representative government expresses itself perpetually through the 
authority  of the  state.  The  power  of the  state  to  legislate  (or  not legislate) 
necessarily  increments  that  authority.  Each  gesture  of government  further 
distances that authority from its supposed source, the citizemy. The history of 
the  nation  state  is  replete  with  instances  of  excess-authority  which  is 
indifferent,  if not  violently  hostile,  to  the interests,  desires  and  freedoms  of 
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These  failings  in  practice  are  fundamentally  immanent  in  representative 
democracy's discursive embryo. As Hobbes, Rousseau and Schumpeter attempt 
to overcome the fundamental tensions of complex modernism, they necessarily 
privilege the authority and rationality of competitive capitalism; the delegation 
of power  upward  is  necessarily  inscribed  with  the  ideology  of  authority, 
hierarchy,  reason,  writing  and  order.  Rousseau's  Romantic  liberalism 
discriminates between different orders of freedom and individuality-as with 
Adam  Smith,  J.S.  Mill,  Immanuel  Kant  and  Matthew  Arnold,  individual 
freedom remains a contingency of 'civility' and a social order which necessarily 
valorizes the (imagined) meretricious over the masses. As numerous critics of 
representationalism have pointed out, the system of delegation had its roots in 
the medieval nobility system; in adapting this model, the bourgeois reformers 
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries constructed a political system which 
maintained their own class interests. That is, the social nexus produced by the 
expansion of 'freedom' was carefully measured so  that the hierarchy of value-
over-time  and  risk  minimization  contributed  to  the  privileges  of  the 
bourgeoisie. 
B.  Participative  democracy  is  closer  to  the  classical  ideal  of Ancient  Greece. 
However, for  the  advocates of representative democracy,  participation is,  as 
much as anything else, a necessary means of ensuring the viability of social and 
political authority and order. An informed and committed citizenry learn about 
their rights and responsibilities  and  willingly participate in the expression of 
their own interests  which  will necessarily accord with  the interests of social 
order.  A  formal  and  informal process of 'civics  training'  would  ensure that 
individuals  and  minority  groups  appreciate  the  need  for  representative 
government, authority and order; they would appreciate, that is, the imperatives 
of rule by the majority.  Public education was  an essential part of the social 
conditioning  process  whereby  the  uneducated  would  be  able  to  access 
information that would enable them to make informed decisions in the principal 
arena  of  participation-elections.  John  Stuart  Mill  argued,  further,  that 
participation  would  aid  this  education  process,  providing  for  citizens  the 
knowledge necessary for the successful functioning of society. 
The ideology of political choice was disseminated through the official writing 
provided by schools.  The concept of participation is formed around ideals of 
civility  and  citizenship  whereby  the  state  and  the  individual  are  conjoined 
through  a  system  of mutual  responsibility.  Beyond  the  electoral  process, 
citizens have also engaged in various forms of lobbying, committee activities, 
petition and legal protest. For Jurgen Habermas, the public sphere becomes an 
available  resource  for  community~based  politics,  local  activism  and 
representation  that  is  not  bordered  by  institutional  standards.  Habermas's 
notions  of intersubjectivity  and  communicative  action  in  the  public  sphere 
suggest that this 'project' of print-based democratic modernization is yet to  be 
fulfilled:  what  is  needed,  Habermas  argues,  is  a  greater  degree  of rational 
public participation so that the inflated authority of the state can be restored to 
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ELECTRONIC AND BROADCAST DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
A number  of commentators  (e.g.  Ess,  1994,  Lanham,  1993,  Landow,  1997) 
have  suggested that the shift from print to electronic and visual media as  the 
primary  communicative  modes  parallels  a  broader  cultural  shift  from  the 
preeminence  of logos and lineal order.  While many of these theorists regard 
computers  as  the central medium in this current communications 'revolution' 
(see  also Poster,  1995),  there is  little doubt that the foundations  for  cultural 
transformation can be located in the emergence of electrical communications 
systems  -telegraphy/telephony,  cinema,  radio  and  television.  Remarkably, 
these media begin their ascent at around the time when print-based democracy 
appears  to  reach its  institutional crescendo.  The new technological cultures, 
however, do not obliterate print culture nor its influence; rather, the emergence 
of  the  new  technological  cultures  stimulates  a  continuing  period  of 
hybridization and accommodation. Print-based democracy is sustained through 
the development of new democratic cultures formed around visualization and 
the  mass  dissemination  of meanings  and  meaning-making  processes.  ill a 
capitalist system which becomes increasingly based around the exchange value 
of  symbols  (Bourdieu,  1990),  these  proliferating  images  and  meanings  are 
engaged through the active imaginings, knowledge and experiential practices of 
'audiences' as 'consumers'. 
A  number  of  twentieth  century  theorists  (e.g.  Heidegger,  Benjamin, 
Baudrillard)  have  argued  that  this  concentration  of  'reality'  through  the 
projection of 'the image' intensifies the problematics of time and space to the 
point  where  'presence'  is  actually  dissolved.  Heidegger (1977),  in particular, 
pioneers  this  idea when he  suggests  that the  'age  of the  world as  picture' is 
characterized  by  the  oscillation  of  reality:  the  world  of  phenomena  is 
'objectified' in the image which is 'brought toward' and 'set before' the viewing 
subject.  The  'objectified' presence  of the  image  obscures  its  actual  absence, 
creating the conditions for a centralization of the subject: that is, the subject is 
the centre of the world-as-picture since the world exists (is objectified) for him 
or  her  to  view.  Benjamin,  similarly,  discusses  the  loss  of aesthetic  'aura'  or 
'presence'  in the motion picture,  while Baudrillard claims  that all reality has 
been transformed through the proliferation of imagistic simulacra. 
We  have  suggested  above  that  the  absence-presence  dichotomy  is 
characteristic of print-based culture and that it is formed primarily through the 
~istillation  of  time.  ill fact,  we  would  suggest  that  the  concentration  of 
~~formation  through  the  image,  along  with  its  rapid  reproduction  and 
~Issemination, serves to intensify further the absence-presence dichotomy and 
1~s inevitable instability. It is not, as McLuhan and later Baudrillard argue, that 
tune and meaning are obliterated by this visual proliferation. Rather, the nexus 
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processes of concentration and diffusion; meaning and  time are unravelled in 
the moment of the image's presence. The image's exhibition is simultaneously 
an appearance, a presence and a dissemination. It is here, elsewhere and gone in 
the one moment. It 'goes out' and 'moves on' to be instantaneously replaced by 
another  image,  another  concentration,  another  meaning,  another  possibility, 
another  arousal.  And  it  is  not,  as  Heidegger  suggests,  that  the  subject  is 
centralized  and  problematised  in  this  motion,  but  that  the  subject  is 
concentrated and diffused through the same instantaneous and erratic motion. 
In other words, the instantaneity of the image is simultaneously a movement of 
concentration and a movement of dispersal. The absence-presence which forms 
the text is rendered even more vulnerable as meanings rush inward and outward 
from the signifier to the signified. The greater precariousness of time and hence 
value-over-time leads necessarily to a multiple and immediate reproduction of 
significations, divisions and dissociations-meanings emerge and vanish with 
breath-taking rapidity. 
The imagined distillation of time in print-based text marks the beginning 
of the absence-presence  dichotomy; electronic and broadcast media produce an 
instantaneity  which  simultaneously  associates  and  dissociates  not  only  the 
meaning of time, but all signification. This of course includes the meaning of 
freedom  and  choice.  The  nexus  of individual  and  social  mass  which  is 
constituted through consumer choice and political choice is clearly destabilized 
through  the  processes  of instantaneity.  The  proliferation  of electronically 
constituted choice escapes  the  foundations  of Enlightenment reason, escapes 
the controlling eye of print-based rationality. However, the challenge of these 
dissociations  does  not  obliterate  meaning  or  power  or  rationality.  The 
electronic cultures operate in perpetual dialogues with print-based dictions and 
desires.  The  desire  for  presence,  the  desire  for  logos,  remain.  But they  are 
mutants  which  must  constantly  communicate  with  and  through  electronic 
modes and their propensity for disruption and an accelerated engagement with 
the  time-present.  Consumption  and  consumption  choice  are  captured  in  the 
mesmera  of the  electronic  image  and  by  the  demands  of a  new  political 
condition. 
To this extent, new modes of cultural democracy are being formed out of 
these  new,  electronically  generated  choices.  Again,  we  can  identify  two 
democratic cultures that are constituted around electronic media technology-
celebrity and visceral democratic cultures. 
A.  Celebrity  democratic  culture  is  formed  around  the  pre-eminence  of specific 
individuals within the media sphere. While many of these celebrities are drawn 
from the spectacle entertainment zones  of music,  film,  television and  sport, 
others such as Princess Diana are sourced from an hereditary imaginary. In any 
case,  they  are  part  of the  cultural  fantasies  which  are  constructed  out  of 
capitalist competitiveness and the privileging of the image. In many respects, 
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worthy meritocracy. The celebrity is  paradoxically 'of the people' and yet has 
the capacity to shine brighter than the common star. The celebrity is special but 
necessarily  'among  us'  This  specialness  is  borne  out of the  devotions  and 
interests  of the  commoner,  whi<;h  means  celebrities  belong to  the lives  and 
sensibilities of ordinary people. 
Of course there is a hegemony associated with capitalist hierarchy systems; this 
is particularly evident in the corporatisation of entertainment and the capacity 
of large organizations to 'create' stars. Even these created celebrities, however, 
must constantly present and re-validate themselves to the consuming choices of 
the viewer. Celebrity authority is necessarily subject to the power of the public 
gaze.  To  this  extent,  celebrity  hegemony  is  precarious  since  it involves  a 
complicated  pas-de-deux  between  consumer  and  image,  a  game-playing  in 
which the meaning of the star is unstably rendered through the value-over-time 
of consumer interests  and  tastes.  Within an unstable culture,  the  subject-as-
consumer  can  never  be  assumed,  but  must  constantly  be  re-negotiated  in 
relation to perpetually changing subjectivities, fashions and conditions. 
The  celebrity,  to  this  extent,  represents  another  permutation  of  absence-
presence. The subject consumer constructs the relationship with the celebrity as 
personal,  the  celebrity as  a  significant other.  In the  absence of community, 
personal  success,  intimacy,  or  leadership,  the  subject-consumer negotiates  a 
presence for the celebrity as  a genuine presence: that is,  as  a personal friend, 
lover,  leader, family  member and  so  on.  However,  this  presence is  always 
marked by the mesmerism of the celebrity's special gifts or merits, and so the 
celebrity, while present and personal, is always distanced by the specialness of 
the celebrity within a representational context. This absence-presence is formed 
through  the  complex  associations  and  oppositions  immanent  to  capitalist 
consumer culture. 
Thus,  just  as  state  endorsed  politicians  must  present  themselves  to  the 
electorate  for  election,  the  celebrity  is  constantly  negotiating  a  cultural 
hegemony  within the  imaginary of the cultural  consumer.  In this  sense,  the 
celebrities' status as 'cultural politicians' may be activated through a quite self-
conscious  participation in social issues- in  support of indigenous people's 
rights, gay rights, environmentalism, endorsement of particular political parties 
or  politicians.  As  well  as  this  more print-based political  activism,  however, 
celebrity politicians may operate simply as 'alternative subjectivities', providing 
the raw materials for the consumer's more personal or 'visceral' liberation. 
In either case, the celebrity is participating in the complex operations of power, 
most  particularly as  it  is  expressed  and  experienced through  mediation and 
representation.  Institutional  parliamentary,  print-based politicians,  of course, 
have also been forced to accommodate celebrity and televisual democracy in a 
similar  way.  Personality  politics  have  brought  politicians  and  their 
subjectivities  under  the  same  gaze  as  entertainers.  The  proliferation  of 
persuasion information has created a politician of the centre, one who responds 
constantly to  popularity and opinion polls, one who  perpetually negotiates a 
discourse which is least offensive to the majority of audience consumers. These 
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themselves invent; their principal communicative mode is the media release, the 
doorstop  interview  and  the five  second  grab.  The presentation of policy is 
formed  around  the  advertising  and  promotion  campaigns  of electioneering, 
including  the  cliche  of  the  leaders'  debate.  As  many  recent  political 
commentators  bemoan,  electoral  choice  is  now  analogous  to  celebrity 
popularity polling. The 2000 U.S. election is the most spectacular example of a 
political contest which could not be resolved through print-based processes, but 
which  lingered  through  an  excruciating  popularity  debate  played  out  on 
television and centring on the respective efficacy of  human and computer-based 
vote-counting. 
B.  Visceral democracy is  not a  re-rendering of participative public democracy, 
even though there are some clear overlaps. In fact, a visceral democratic culture 
is  formed  around the experiences of the body, most particularly as  they are 
associated  with  the  discursive  intonations  or  dictions  which  constitute 
individual  subjectivity.  This  permutation of democracy  derives  less  from  a 
pluralism which is constituted through an overriding, homogenizing ideal such 
as the 'American way of life'; rather, it is closer to the postmodern ideal of a 
celebrational difference. A visceral democratic culture is somewhat more subtle 
than particular areas of postmodern theory, however, as it remains unspecified, 
operating at the level of everyday practice, experience or the 'unconscious' (de 
Certeau,  1984).  In  this  way,  subjects  interact  with  mediated  discourses, 
including the text of the celebrity, in order to form their own personal regime of 
democracy and the political. 
To this  extent,  visceral democracy is related to, but ultimately distinct from, 
participative democracy which confirms the validity of political consensus or 
authority and which seeks primarily the enhancement of the democratic forum. 
Participation is  formed  around  the logical  ordering of issues  and  the direct 
reconciliation  of  modernist  tensions,  most  especially  the  dichotomy  of 
individual and collective interests. Visceral democratic culture operates through 
and for the almost-anarchy of self-preservation and self-gratification, whether 
or  not  that  is  logically  or  sensationally  motivated.  Ultimately,  visceral 
democracy  is  pleasure-centred,  animated  by  the  possibilities  of subjective 
ecstasy and the elimination or minimization of subjective harm. 
For numerous theorists, the new mediated technologies provide opportunities 
for greater individual engagements with visceral experiences. In particular, the 
personal  production  capacity  of  computers  and  the  distributive  and 
communicative  capacity  of networked  computers  allow users  to  create  and 
share  text  with  like-minded  others.  This  type  of  democratic  culture  is 
fundamentally embedded in the problematics of consumption and choice. Many 
recent  political  theorists  (see  McGuigan,  1992,  1996)  reject  this  mode  of 
popular  self-interest  as  either  cynical  and  apolitical,  or  reactionary  and 
confirming status  quo  print-based hegemonies.  Other theorists  (e.g.  Bakhtin 
and Medvedev,  1978, Barthes,  1977, de Certeau,  1984) suspect that visceral 
populism implicates a substantive liberational potential. At the centre of this 
debate are contending views about the political worth of consumer capitalism, 
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question collapses however, when we remember that electronic democracy is 
necessarily  formed  around  the  problematics  of associating  and  dissociating 
culture. The nexus that bonds individuals to the collective whole is formed out 
of an  increasingly  complex  and  unstable  interaction  of dichotomous  and 
competing  dictions  or  heterodictions.  These  heterodictions  move  in  variant 
directions  seeking  both  a  uniformity  and  stability  on  the  one  hand,  and  an 
uneasy self-interest on the other. Subjects function within this general condition 
of opposition where  time and place are concentrated through the commodity 
image and its problematical instantaneity-the intensified absence-presence of 
time.  The meanings  constituted through  these  heterodictions  are forged  and 
dissolved  within  this  general  condition;  their  politics,  including,  their 
formations of democratic culture, can never escape this perpetual positioning, 
re-alignment and re-positioning. 
The  question,  therefore,  is  not  whether  visceral  democracy  is  liberatory  or 
reactionary,  but rather how can this  mode of democracy be  most adequately 
mobilised for the sake of liberation. The answer to this question is only partial, 
since  this  form of liberation needs  to  be measured  and engaged through  the 
other modes of democratic culture discussed above. Thus, we are contending 
that  visceral  democracy  is  only  one  mode  of political  engagement  and  its 
isolation as  'irrelevant' or transformative is misguided. In the multiple dictions 
and language wars that constitute the contemporary cultural assemblage, we can 
identify  various  modes  that  will  produce  various  effects-some modes  are 
complementary and others discordant. Visceral democracy is part of a broader 
ambit of deployable modes. 
Andre the Giant and other Y2K Democratic Avatars 
What needs to be understood very clearly is that democracy as a concentration 
of these  political meanings  cannot be restricted to  operations of government 
and  governance.  The 'demos'  of democracy cannot be  discursively contained 
within a notion of citizenry where the citizen is conceived only in terms of an 
individual's  relationship  with  the  state.  If we  are  to  maintain  a  notion  of 
citizenship, then the concept must be broadened and opened at the edges so that 
the 'subject-citizen' does not exist merely in terms of the state and its authority. 
Governance  must  reach  beyond  the  parameters  of  political  choice  and 
~elegation, beyond the parameters of initiations. The concepts of 'choice' and 
freedom'  need  to  be  interrogated  in  order  to  problematise  the  notion  of 
democracy. Our preference for the concept of 'democratic cultures' facilitates a 
definition  of the  individual citizen  as  a  social  actor,  or more  specifically  a 
meaning-maker,  who operates in relation to complex cultural associations and 
communicative mediations. 
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The essential concern ...  [is]  the relationship between democratic institutions 
and  the  increasing  complexity  of post-industrial  societies.  ...  Our  present 
theories  of democracy  fail  to  offer  us  conceptual  instruments  sufficiently 
complex to permit a realistic interpretation of that relationship. As we prepare 
to  enter the  third  millennium,  Western political  theory  appears  increasingly 
unable  to  cope  with  the  massive  transformation  which  'the  information 
revolution'  is  bringing  about  in  the  primary  subsystems  of  industrialized 
society.  These  transformations  seem  certain  to  speed  up  the  processes  of 
functional specialization and consequently ...  to bring about still further large-
scale growth of social complexity (Zolo, 1992: 54). 
Part of the problem for political theory,  however,  is the privileging and 
hence separation  of politics over culture.  Zolo himself concedes as  much in 
suggesting  that political  theory  generally  and  democratic  theory  specifically 
transgress  the  general  empirical  trajectory  of modernity  toward  increasing 
levels  of  differentiation,  specialization  and  social  complexity.  Democratic 
government, according to Zolo, is formed against this trend since the 'general 
function  of a  modem  political  system  is  that  of reducing  fear  through  a 
selective regulation of social risks and a competitive distribution of "security 
values"'  (Zolo,  1992:  55).  This  'amelioration  of  social  risk'  operates 
hegemonically, privileging the interests of particular social groups over others 
in  a  competitive  cultural  and  economic  context.  To this  extent,  'the  central 
categories  of the  political code  are  the  inclusion/exclusion principle and the 
asymmetric power/subordination relation' (Zolo, 1992: 55). 
Zolo rightly places the formation  of representative government within a 
context of increasing differentiation. However, Zolo himself fails to appreciate 
fully the  cultural tensions which produce politics generally, and the 'political 
system'  of representative  government  specifically.  As  noted  earlier  in  the 
current essay, modem cultures are formed through ongoing language wars and 
tensions;  despite  Rousseau's  assurance,  representative  government  neither 
obliterates nor resolves the tensions that are central to its own forming cultural 
corpus.  Rather,  representative democratic culture is  replete with internal and 
external  struggles  which place it within the broadening field  of complexity. 
This print-based democracy contributes to the complexity it was established to 
resolve  and  control.  In fact,  representative  government  constitutes  another 
diction  in  the  proliferating  imaginary  of contemporary  culture.  Part  of the 
reason for Zolo's oversight is his tendency to place representative government 
at the centre of his readings of politics; even as  critique, this approach to  the 
relationship between culture and politics tends  inevitably to distract from the 
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ANDRE THE GIANT 
As  with all  cultural experiences, there may be individuals who participate in 
various  forms  of democratic  culture:  Moreover,  the  cultures  themselves  are 
effectively transcultural, unstable and subject to various forms of hybridization. 
The  four  democratic  cultures  discussed  in  this  paper  operate 
contemporaneously, sometimes harmoniously, sometimes discordantly. In many 
cases, the invocation of 'democratic principles' often mobilizes variant elements 
within the cultures discussed. In other words, we may have a political action in 
which  the  contesting  parties  draw  on  the  'democratic  ideals'  that  operate 
through these complex political dictions. Our Y2K refugees, for example, are 
visceral politicians, seeking a utopian imaginary that is personally oriented and 
beyond  the  limits  of modern,  print-based  institutional  processes.  They  look 
beyond the choices provided by government and consumer hegemony, though 
inevitably  their  imaginary  must  appropriate  the  resources,  including  the 
computer resources, provided by that hegemony. Their aim, of course, was to 
transcend that hegemony, replacing it with a more compassionate, ecologically 
sensitive  and  creative  cultural  'presence'  that  would  replace  the  unsettling 
absence-presence through which their lives had been 'governed'. As in Marx's 
notions of social autonomy, the Y2K utopians envisaged a transitional anarchy 
through  which  self-governance  would  emerge  as  sovereign.  The  Y2Kers, 
therefore,  were  drawing  on  various  democratic  dictions  in order to  imagine 
their better future. 
This  permutation  of  the  Y2K  millenary  was  not,  however,  entirely 
escapist,  nor  was  it illusory.  In fact,  the  Y2Kers  were  seeking  to  mobilise 
various  elements  of  their  culture  in  order  to  reconstruct  the  functioning 
possibilities of choice and liberation. In many respects, this deployment of the 
newer  media  technologies  is  paralleled  through  the  broader  activities  of 
computer networked political activism. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature 
of  this  newer  media  is  its  integration  of  broadcast,  narrowcast  and 
interpersonal/telephonic capacities; its integrative capacities combine elements 
of print and electronic broadcasting with oral cultural modes. This integration 
provides  even  greater  opportunities  for  activation  of democratic  meaning-
making  than  the  previous,  more  separate  print  and  electrical  media.  The 
networked  media is  facilitating  greater hybridizations  and contiguities  in the 
democratic cultures. 
To  this  extent,  the  networked media is  not 'naturally'  conducive toward 
lesser or greater democratic culture. It may be deployed,  as  with print, radio 
and TV, in the interests of despotism, surveillance and discipline, or individual 
and  minority group  liberation.  Equally,  the new media may contribute to,  or 
~etract  from,  any  of  the  democratic  cultures  discussed  above.  What  is 
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against their own value-over-time processes, their own instantaneity, their own 
hegemonic  cultural  impulses.  'Culture  jamming',  the  deliberate  clogging  of 
capitalist instantaneities by political activists, represents a self-reflexive assault 
on the  underlying dichotomies  over which contemporary capitalist culture is 
formed. That is, the absence-presence  which motivates consumption practices 
is  turned  against  itself  in  order  to  expose  and  ultimately  'deconstruct',  in 
Derridean terms, its underlying 'assumptions'.  Problematically, of course,  and 
as  we  have  stressed  during  the  course  of this  paper,  these  assumptions  are 
vacated or absent. The culture jammers, therefore, are exposing the dissociative 
core, the absence of value and the fatuousness or impossibility of instantaneity. 
In other words, the culture jammers are exposing the vacant core of symbolic 
value-the evasiveness of meaning. 
Culture jamming is  sometimes regarded by serious political theory as  an 
act  of pure  cynicism  or  vacuous  delinquency  since  it  generally  offers  no 
alternative  structure  and  no  clear  manifesto.  It  targets  and  assaults  global 
corporations'  computer systems,  it distributes  pop  culture graffiti throughout 
the networked system,  it hacks into email systems and clogs their operations. 
As  we have noted elsewhere (Best and Lewis, 2000), global computer viruses 
like Melissa often mimic  the normal processing of corporate communication: 
they  penetrate  corporations'  electronic  walls  through  normal  fissures  in 
technological  and  human  practices  and  simply  behave  like  'normal' 
communications though in a parodic, extended and accelerated manner until the 
whole  system  crashes  under  the  weight  of its  own  artificial  intelligence. 
Shepard  Fallrey,  the  creator of the  culture jamming hero,  Andre  the  Giant, 
claims similarly that his adaption and distribution of the image of the popular 
wrestler is merely an act of cultural manifestation. Andre is 'flung down' into a 
world which may deploy him in any way that it conceives as 'valuable'-
The  GIANT  sticker  campaign  can  be  described  as  an  experiment  in 
Phenomenology. Heidegger describes Phenomenology as  the process of letting 
things  manifest  themselves.  Phenomenology  attempts  to  enable people  to  see 
clearly something that is right before their eyes but obscured; things that are so 
taken for granted that they are muted by abstract observation. 
THE FIRST AIM  OF PHENOMENOLOGY is to reawaken a sense of wonder 
about one's environment.  The Giant sticker attempts to  stimulate curiosity and 
bring  people  to  question  both  the  sticker  and  their  relationship  with  their 
surroundings (Fallrey, 2000). 
The broad dissemination and re-appropriation of the Giant graffiti constitutes a 
simple but effective political gesture.  Beginning as  a sticker for skateboards, 
the  Andre  icon  has  entered  the  Internet  as  a  wildly  unspecific  politics  of 
'presence',  combining  celebrity  populism with  a  broad  desire  by  individual 
subjects to be heard amidst the cacophony of proliferating communication. In a 
sense,  the  Giant  is  a  reflexive  and  radical  phenomenology  which  uses  the AFTER Y2K  125 
means of its oppression against the oppressors. These oppressors, however, are 
unspecified and barely locatable in a culture which is  constructed out of the 
absence-presence  of meaning.  In this  sense,  there is no enemy,  no political 
adversary,  only a series of historically formed processes which function as the 
conduit of oppression and surveillance, the source of personal restriction and 
deprivation. 
To  this extent, this combination of celebrity and visceral democracy is  a 
good deal less self-conscious, but in no way less mischievous, than other forms 
of culture jamming such as hacking, clogging and targetted virus release. Even 
so,  the Andre the Giant campaign operates as  a political mirror, reflecting the 
extent  to  which our cultures are  formed  around dissociative meanings  and  a 
value-over-time which is fundamentally vacant at its core. Andre has  a posse, 
but  the  posse  is  a  parody  of  law-making  and  the  artifice  of constructed 
authority.  'Obey the Giant' is not like Orwell's Big Brother, but is a subversive 
refraction,  a breaking up  of the  subtle and infinite rules  that govern us.  The 
popularity  of the  Andre  icon  in youth  culture  exposes  how  politics  can  be 
unspecific and generated through popular imagery and a self-gratification that 
has no  source and no end. As  Colin Berry has noted, Fairey's aim is  to 'open 
people's  eyes  to  the  system by  participating  in  the  process  ...  Andre  is  so 
ridiculous that there's nothing left but the process' (1996). In our view, it is not 
just the process that the Giant reveals; it is the presence-absence that operates 
through the instantaneity of our mediated meaning-making. 
Conclusion: The Golden Clock, the Democratic Shadow 
Culture jamming, electronic graffiti, virus release and hacking constitute more 
than just a baring of process. They constitute a form of radical cynicism which 
is often articulated through a parodic, comic or sexual gesture. The deployment 
of  the  new  technologies  in  hegemonic  processes  necessarily  stimulates  the 
countermoves  of  opposition  and  deconstruction.  Networked  computer 
technologies,  therefore,  operate  within  a  broad field  of competing dictions: 
pleasure, individual self-expression, choice, and the desire for presence may be 
mobilised  for  the  construction  or  deconstruction  of capitalist  hegemonies. 
Meanings may be appropriated, shaped and controlled by corporations in order 
to  exert  power  and  maximize  the  gratifications  of  directors,  employees, 
shareholders  and  governments;  simultaneously,  these  meanings  may  be  re-
shaped,  deconstructed  and  dissociated  through  the  conscious  or unconscious 
?Perations  of  meaning-making  and  unmaking.  The  absence-presence  of 
Instantaneity  upon  which  these  corporate  structures  are  formed  render  them 
necessarily vulnerable to the processes of deconstruction and dissociation. 
d  The  Y2Kers  who  sought  relief  from  the  threat  of  one  of  these 
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predispositions as other radical cynics. The shadow of an unfulfilled reality is 
cast over the lives of all Millennia! citizens. As Heidegger argues, the essence 
of our modernism centres on our propensity to represent the world as picture or 
image. We may accept the diversity and plenitude of the world so long as it is 
objectified as representation and so long as  our own individual subjectivity is 
centralised in the process.  For Heidegger,  however,  the  reality of the  image 
becomes a 'shadow' as  man becomes subject and  the  world becomes picture 
(1977:  135).  In  a  metaphor  which  refers  both  to  the  technological 
miraculousness and aesthetic mysteriousness of the moving picture, Heidegger 
conceives of the shadow as casting itself across the breadth of modem life. But 
the metaphor also refers to the unknowable and insidious condition of modern 
life where 'the shadow ... points to  something else, which it is denied to us of 
today to know' (Heidegger, 1977: 136). 
As we have noted, a number of theorists of postmodemism suggest that we 
have  moved  beyond  Heidegger's  phenomenological  doubts  toward  a  more 
celebratory  aesthetic.  This  pleasure  of the  text  thesis,  however,  limits  our 
capacity to  understand  the  continuity  and deepening  of the  problematics  of 
representation. Heidegger's shadow reaches into our political domain, casting 
considerable  doubt  in  the  minds  of many  as  to  the  continued  validity  of 
democratic theory and the ideal of emancipation. In our view, the instantaneity 
of the picture destabilizes  both the  image  and the  subject,  rendering each a 
shadow  of the  other.  The  golden  clock  that  stands  in  the  middle  of the 
provincial  township  of Bendigo  marks  this  problematic.  Its  relentless  and 
frequently  inaccurate  rendering  of the  progress  and  repetitiveness  of time 
synthesizes  the challenges  posed by an  incomplete  modernism-that is,  the 
alleviation of absurd and unjust authority. But the clock is also an assemblage 
of the minutiae of the  temporal moment.  It remains  as  a  symbol  of what it 
cannot adequately represent and what it cannot adequately mean. In a political 
culture  which  draws  together  the  discomforting  imperatives  of  global 
participation and local liberation, and where hegemony and the imperviousness 
of government has extended beyond national electorates, the  golden clock of 
Bendigo  stands  as  a relic  of modernism's  unenviable  aspirations.  The  clock 
casts its own shadow over the eyes of those who behold it; it casts a shadow 
over their inquiry and the meanings they place on its answer. 
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